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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
• Petitioner, 
- and - . CASE NO. C-6071 
COUNTY OF ONEIDA, 
Employer, 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
1
 Incumbent/lntervenor. 
STEVEN A. CRAIN and DAREN J. RYLEWICZ, DEPUTY CO-COUNSEL , for 
Petitioner 
SAUNDERS KAHLER, LLP (GREGORY J. AMBOROSO, ESQ., of Counsel), 
for Employer 
GARY M. HICKEY, for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On July 15, 2011, the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (petitioner) filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the 
Public Employment Relations Board, a timely petition seeking certification as the 
exclusive representative of certain employees of the County of Oneida (employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: ', . 
Included: See attached list of titles. 
Excluded: All others. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on December 2, 
2011, at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition should be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. . 
DATED: January 24, 2012 
Albany, New York 
/-" Sheila S. Cole, Member 
WHITE COLLAR TITLES 
r~~. Account Clerk 
..'' Account Clerk-Typist 
Accounting Administrative Officer 
Accounting Supervisor 
Administrative Assistant 
Administrative' Officer 
Aging Services Aide 
Assistant Director of Income Maintenance 
Assistant Motor Vehicle Bureau Supervisor 
Assistant Real Property System (RPS) Coordinator 
. Assistant Recreation Director 
Assistant Youth Bureau Director' 
Associate Graphic Artist 
Associate Nutrition Services Coordinator 
Associate Planner. 
Associate Workforce Development Coordinator 
Auditor I 
Auditor II 
Auditor 111 
. Buyer 
Case Manager ., 
Case Supervisor, Grade A 
Case Supervisor, Grade B 
Caseworker ' 
Central Stores Clerk 
\ Chief Social Welfare Examiner 
. / Chief Tax Clerk 
Child Assistance Program (CAP) Coordinator 
• Child Support Unit Supervisor Assistant 
Children & Family Services Specialist 
Clerk 
Community Services Aide • ' , 
Community Services Worker 
Computer Programmer 
Computer Specialist ' '. 
Computer Technical Assistant . 
• Confidential Investigator , 
• • Confidential Support Investigator 
• Contract Administrator 
Court-Reporter 
Crime Victim Advocate 
Crisis Intervention'Counselor 
Customer Relations Supervisor 
Data Processing Clerk 
Data Processor I 
Data Processor II 
• Delinquent Tax Clerk 
• Director of Records Management 
Disbursements Officer 
Engineering. Aide 
N Engineering Technician • 
J Environmental Health & Safety Officer ' 
WHITE COLLAR TITLES 
Environmental Health Inspector 
Family Services Specialist 
Finance Administrative Officer 
Gang Intelligence Investigator . 
Geographic Information Systems (G|S) Analyst 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Coordinator 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Technician I 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) techriician II 
Head Social Welfare Examiner 
HIV Coordinator 
Instructional Computing Specialist 
Inventory Records Clerk 
Investigative Financial Analyst 
Job Development & Placement Manager. 
Junior Engineering Aide' 
Junior Planner 
Junior Planning Aide' 
Law Clerk 
Library Clerk 
Licensed Practical Nurse 
Mail and Supply Clerk 
Mail Clerk • 
Managed Care Supervisor 
Map Room Clerk 
Medical Records Clerk ^ 
Medical Services Coordinator 
Medical Social Work Supervisor 
Medical Worker 
Microfilm Operator 
Motor Vehicle Bureau Supervisor 
Motor Vehicle Operator • 
Motor Vehicle'Representative 
Network Administrator I 
Network Administrator II 
Nurse Practitioner • 
Office Manager . 
Office of Continuing Care Program Nurse 
Office of Continuing Care Senior Social Worker 
Office Specialist I 
Office Specialist II 
Offset Duplicating .Machine Operator : 
Outreach Worker 
Paralegal Assistant 
Parent Aide , 
Parent Aide Supervisor 
Payroll Clerk 
Personnel Assistant 
Personnel Technician I . 
Phlebotomist-Outreach Worker 
Planner • . • , 
Planning Specialist 
Pre-K Special Education Specialist 
WHITE COLLAR TITLES 
N Principal Account Clerk 
i Principal Accounting Supervisor 
Principal Clerk 
Principal Office Specialist 
Principal Public Health Sanitarian • 
Principal Social Welfare Examiner 
Printing Helper 
Printing Supervisor (MVCC) 
Probation Assistant 
Probation Officer 
Probation Supervisor 
Program Analyst ., 
Psychiatric Social Worker I 
Public Health Engineer 
Public Health,Sanitarian. 
Public Health Technician I . 
Public Health Technician II - - . ' • • ' 
. Real Property Administrative Officer 
Real Property Systems (RPS) Coordinator • 
Research Analyst 
Research Assistant 
Resource Investigator 
Secretary to Director Real Property Tax Services 
Senior Account Clerk 
Senior Account Clerk-Typist 
.Senior Administrative Assistant 
/Senior Buyer: 
Senior Caseworker < -
Senior Clerk 
Senior Computer Operator ; 
Senior Computer Programmer Analyst . 
Senior Confidential Investigator 
Senior Drafter 
Senior Engineering Aide 
Senior Family Services Specialist 
Senior Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Analyst 
• Senior Medical Worker 
Senior Motor Vehicle Representative 
Senior Nutrition Outreach. Worker 
Senior Office Specialist 1 
. Senior Office Specialist II 
Senior Offset Printing Machine Operator 
Senior Planner 
Senior Probation Officer 
Senior Public Health Engineer 
Senior Public Health Sanitarian 
Senior Resource Investjgator 
Senior Social Services Investigator 
Senior Social Welfare Examiner 
Senior Support Investigator 
Senior Tax Map Technician 
J Senior Workforce Development Coordinator 
WHITE COLLAR TITLES. 
Senior Workforce Development Counselor 
; Social Services Investigator 
Social Welfare Examiner 
Social. Worker Assistant 
Stock Clerk 
Stop DWI Program Administrator 
Store Clerk (MVCC) . 
Supervising Campus Security Officer 
Supervising Office of Continuing Care Nurse i 
Supervising Resource Investigator 
Supervising Support Investigator 
Support Investigator 
Systems Analyst 
Tax Abstract Clerk 
Tax Clerk • 
Tax Map Technician 
Telephone Operator I 
Telephone Operator II 
Transportation Analyst 
Transportation-Coordinator 
Victim/Witness Coordinator • 
Vocational Education Counselor • , . - . " , 
Webmaster 
Welfare Management Systems Coordinator 
W1C Nutrition Technician 
x WIC Nutritionist , . . . . 
) Workforce Development Coordinator 
Workforce Development Counselor 
Workforce Development Interviewer 
• Workforce Development Special Project Coordinator 
Youth Program Director ' . . ' . . -
MVCC 
UPSEU - WHITE COLLAR UNIT 
CURRENT JOB TITLES 
Account Clerk 
Administrative Assistant 
Central Stores Clerk 
Data Processing Clerk 
Data Processor I 
Environmental Health & Safety Officer 
Library Clerk 
Mail Clerk . 
Office Specialist I 
Office Specialist II ' 
Principal Account Clerk 
Senior Account Clerk 
Senior Clerk. 
Senior Administrative Assistant 
Senior Office Specialist I 
Senior Offset Printing Macliine Operator • 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-6072 
COUNTY OF ONEIDA, 
Employer, 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Incumbent/lntervenor. 
STEVEN A. CRAIN and DAREN J. RYLEWICZ, DEPUTY CO-COUNSEL , for 
Petitioner 
SAUNDERS KAHLER, LLP (GREGORY J. AMBOROSO, ESQ., of Counsel), 
for Employer 
GARY M. HICKEY, for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On July 15, 2011, the CivirService Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (petitioner) filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the 
Public Employment Relations Board, a timely petition seeking certification as the 
exclusive representative of certain employees of the County of Oneida (employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
Included: See attached list of titles. 
Excluded: All others. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on December 2, 
2011, at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition should be, and 
it.hereby is, dismissed. . • 
DATED: January 24, 2012 
Albany, New York 
VIAAiTi^-^ 
'Jerome Lefkowitz/Chairper£6n 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
BLUE COLLAR TITLES 
) • Aircraft Service Supervisor : . - •. 
Aircraft Service Worker • 
Airport Electrician 
Airport Heavy Equipment Operator . . . • 
, Airport Maintenance Supervisor • , ' , 
.• Airport Maintenance Worker ' •.' . 
Assistant Chief Wastewater Treatment Plant Operator 
. Assistant Civil Engineer • • ' • ; " ' . . 
Assistant Engineer • - ' ' ' ' . ' . 
Associate Engineer • ,• 
Automotive Mechanic ' ; 
Automotive Mechanic Supervisor ' • ' 
Building Maintenance Helper ' > - " ' ' . . 
• Building Maintenance Mechanic • • .., . ' . 
. Building Maintenance Supervisor ; 
Building Maintenance Worker ' ' '. 
Bus Dispatcher . • 
Bus Driver • 
Bus Driver/Dispatcher . • 
; Campus Security Officer ' { ; 
Carpenter ! • • . . ' 
Carpenter II • . . - . • . ' " 
Chief Wastewater Solids Disposal-Operator • . . . 
Computer Operator ' • ' . . . ' ' 
District Supervisor ' 
) . Electrical Technician '.'• •.'•• 
Electrician . 
Equipment Technician Expediter .' ' . . 
Field Technician 
Forester 
Grounds Supervisor ' • • 
Heavy Equipment Mechanic • . ' ) 
Heavy Equipment Mechanic Supervisor . . 
Heavy Equipment Operator '
 N '. ' . 
Heavy Motor Equipment Operator. . . • ' ' • • • . 
Highway Maintenance Helper . ' -
Highway Maintenance Worker ' . ' • • • 
Highway Radio Dispatcher • • •' 
HVAC Building Superintendent . . ' . 
• Industrial Waste Chemist - . , - _ ' , 
Junior Wastewater Treatment Plant Operator 
Junior Wastewater. Treatment Plant Operator Trainee . : • / 
Labor Supervisor 
Laboratory Technician (Wastewater Treatment) .
 ; . 
• Laborer.' •• . •' ' 
Light Motor Equipment Operator • ' _ • ' . 
Machinist ' ' 
Mail Courier . . 
• Maintenance Mechanic-Machinist (Wastewater Treatment) .' 
Maintenance Mechanic-Welder (Wastewater Treatment) 
I . Painter • .' 
Parking Attendant . _ ' . . . • 
BLUE COLLAR TITLES 
Security Dispatcher 
Senior Building Maintenance Helper 
Senior Building Maintenance Mechanic 
Senior Campus Security Officer 
Senior Custodian 
Senior Laboratory Technician (Wastewater Treatment) 
Senior Wastewater Treatment Plant Operator' 
Sewer Maintenance & Equipment Operator 
Sewer Maintenance Supervisor . 
Storekeeper 
Superintendent of Airport Maintenance' 
Supervising Building Maintenance Helper 
Supervisor, Building Services 
Wastewater Treatment Plant Attendant 
Wastewater Treatment Plant Electrician 
Wastewater Treatment Plant Maintenance Helper 
Wastewater Treatment Plant Maintenance Supervisor 
Wastewater Treatment Plant Maintenance Worker 
Wastewater Treatment Plant Operator '. 
Wastewater Treatment Plant Operator/Trainee 
Water'Resources Chemist 
Working Supervisor , .. 
MVCC 
UPSEU BLUE COLLAR UNIT 
CURRENT JOB TITLES 
Assistant Building Superintendent 
Building Maintenance Helper 
Building Maintenance Mechanic 
Building Maintenance Supervisor 
Building Maintenance Worker . 
Campus Security Officer 
HVAC Building Superintendent 
Labor Supervisor 
Light Motor Equipment Operator 
Mail Courier ' . 
Painter 
Security Dispatcher 
Senior Campus Security Officer. 
Storekeeper • _ 
Working Supervisor . . . 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
< Petitioner, -
-and- CASE NO. C-6081 
MASTICS-MORICHES-SHIRLEY COMMUNITY 
LIBRARY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, ' 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., -
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-6081 - 2 -
Included: Account Clerk, Library Clerk, Library Clerk (Spanish Speaking), 
Senior Library Clerk, Principal Library Clerk, Community Service 
Aide, Technical Coordinator I.& II, Computer Technician, Custodial 
Worker I, II & III, Librarian I & II, Librarian l-Children's Services, 
Library Assistant, Librarian Trainee, Page and Guard. 
Excluded: Director, Assistant Director, Business Manager II, Librarian III, 
Senior Account Clerk, Network & Systems Technician, Literacy 
Volunteer Program Coordinator, Circulation Department Head and 
Digital Services Department Head. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, orany 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 24, 2012 
Albany, New York 
k/iASUPfr^-
Jerome Lefkojwitz, Chairperson 
^ Sheila S. ColeT Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SOUTH SENECA ADMINISTRATORS' 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-6085 
SOUTH SENECA CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair ^ 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, . . . ' < ' ' 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the South Seneca Administrators' Association 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-6085 - 2 -
• Included: Regularly appointed employees in the positions of High School 
Principal, Middle School Principal, Elementary School Principal and 
Director of Special Programs. 
Excluded: Superintendent and School Bus Official. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively, with the South Seneca Administrators' Association. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
, employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 24, 2012 
Albany, New York 
JJW*<^ ryS0<frm?\ 
Jerome Lefkgtwitz, Chairperson 
-U2_ 
Sheila S^  Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- . CASE NO. C-6026A 
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK and SUFFOLK COUNTY 
COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
Joint Employer, • „ 
-and-
SUFFOLK COUNTY ASSOCIATION OF 
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, INC., 
Intervenor/lncumbent. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations, Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected,1 . 
• Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
1
 By.letter dated October 28, 2011, the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 
1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO notified PERB that it disclaims any interest in representing 
this unit. 
Certification C-6026A -2-
Employment Act, • 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Suffolk County Association of Municipal 
Employees, Inc., has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above-named joint employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All employees in the titles within Bargaining Unit No. 2 (White 
Collar) who are jointly employed for Taylor Law purposes by 
Suffolk County and Suffolk County Community College. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named joint employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Suffolk County Association of Municipal Employees, Inc. 
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested .by either party. JBuch obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 24, 2012 
Albany, New York 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In.the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-6026B 
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK and SUFFOLK COUNTY 
COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
Joint Employer, 
-and- -
SUFFOLK COUNTY ASSOCIATION OF 
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, INC., 
Intervenor/lncumbent. 
. BOARD DECISION, CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE 
AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
On November 5, 2010, the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 
1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO filed a timely petition for decertification of the Suffolk County 
Association of Municipal Employees, Inc., as the current negotiating representative for 
certain employees who were within a unit of employees of the County of Suffolk and to 
;be certified as the negotiating representative of a unit of those employees who are 
assigned to the Suffolk County Community College. The.parties agreed to the following 
unit composition: . 
Included: All employees in the titles within Bargaining Unit No. 6 (Blue Collar) 
who are jointly employed for Taylor Law purposes by Suffolk 
County and Suffolk County Community College. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Case No. C-6026B -2-
Upon consent of the parties, a mail ballot election was held on December 9, 
2011. The results of this election show that a majority of eligible employees in the unit 
who cast valid ballots still desire to be represented for purposes of collective 
negotiations by the Suffolk County Association of Municipal Employees, Inc. 
(Intervenor/lncumbent).1 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
) Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, ' 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Suffolk County Association of 
Municipal Employees, Inc., has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named joint employer, in the unit agreed to be most 
appropriate, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations 
and the settlement of grievances. • 
FURTHER, IT-IS ORDERED that the above named joint employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Suffolk County Association of Municipal Employees, Inc. 
1
 Of the 196 ballots case, 142 were for representation and 20 against representation. 
There were 4 challenged ballots. 
Certification - C-6026B -3 
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 24, 2012 
Albany, New York 
\LtO*CryhsL~ 
Jerome Lefkowitz, Clg^frperson 
y Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
IRA J. SMULYAN 
Charging Party, 
CASENO.U-31050 
- and -
STATE OF NEW YORK (INSURANCE DEPARTMENT 
LIQUIDATION BUREAU) and CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Respondents. ' • „ 
IRA J. SMULYAN, pro se 
JACKSON LEWIS LLP (MICHAEL R. HEKLE, of counsel), for STATE OF NEW 
YORK (INSURANCE DEPARTMENT LIQUIDATION BUREAU) 
STEVEN A. CRAIN and DAREN J. RYLEWICZ, DEPUTY CO-COUNSEL for 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Ira J. Smulyan (Smulyan) to 
a decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) dismissing Smulyan's May 12, 2011 improper practice charge, as amended, 
alleging that the State of New York (Insurance Department Liquidation Bureau) 
(Liquidation Bureau) violated §§209-a.1(b) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) and that the Civil Service Employees Association, Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CiO (CSEA) violated §209-a.2(c) of the Act.1 The Director dismissed 
1
 44 PERB H4557(2011). 
Case No. U-31050 _ 2 -
the charge on the grounds that the allegations against the Liquidation Bureau and 
CSEA are untimely, and that Smulyan has failed to allege sufficient facts that, if proven, 
would demonstrate that the Liquidation Bureau violated §§209-a.1(b) and (c) of the Act 
or that CSEA violated §209-a.2(c) of the Act. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In his exceptions, Smulyan seeks reversal of the Director's decision on the 
grounds that his charge is timely and that his charge, as amended, contains clear and 
concise factual allegations setting forth meritorious claims against the Liquidation 
Bureau and CSEA under the Act. The Liquidation Bureau and CSEA urge that we deny 
Smulyan's exceptions, asserting that the Director's decision is substantively correct and 
that the exceptions do not comply with the requirements of §213.2 of our Rules of 
Procedure (Rules). ^ 
( 
Following our careful review of the record, Smulyan's exceptions, and the 
responses from the Liquidation Bureau and CSEA, we affirm the Director's decision. 
FACTS 
In considering Smulyan's exceptions, we assume the truth of the factual 
allegations made in his amended charge, granting all reasonable inferences to the 
alleged facts.2 
2
 Board ofEduc of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York (Grassei), 43 PERB1J3010 
(2010). 
Case No. U-31050 - 3 -
Smulyan was employed by the Liquidation Bureau from 2003 to March 31, 2010. 
Throughout his tenure, Smulyan had disputes with the Liquidation Bureau and his 
immediate supervisor over written evaluations of his work performance. He received at 
least five consecutive negative performance evaluations, and challenged two of those 
evaluations through separate grievances in April 2008 and March 2009. 
In November 2009, CSEA represented Smulyan at a hearing with respect to his 
second grievance. Although the hearing was held before a neutral hearing officer, 
Smulyan alleges that the hearing was unfair because of alleged collusion between the 
Liquidation Bureau and CSEA. In December 2009, CSEA refused Smulyan's request to 
file another grievance challenging an action-plan relating to his performance that was ' 
developed following the hearing officer's written determination. 
On March 16, 2010, Smulyan was suspended with pay after he reported to his 
supervisors that he had discovered an unidentified white powder, which he believed to 
be dangerous, in a cup in his desk drawer. His report precipitated an immediate 
evacuation of his workplace and a hazardous material investigation by federal agents 
and New York City police. Laterthat day, a CSEA representative informed Smulyan . 
that investigators concluded that the white powder was salt. Smulyan was also told that 
the Liquidation Bureau suspected that his report had been a prank. CSEA refused, 
however, to file a grievance challenging Smulyan's suspension. 
While under suspension with pay, Smulyan was offered a severance agreement 
under which the Liquidation Bureau would pay him a monetary amount in exchange for 
his resignation. On March 31, 2010, Smulyan accepted the settlement offer, which was 
Case No. U-31050 - 4 -
rescindable by April 7, 2010. Smulyan chose not to rescind the settlement agreement 
after learning from the Liquidation Bureau's Chief Human Resources Officer that if the 
settlement was rescinded, the Liquidation Bureau would suspend him without pay 
based upon his job performance, including his conduct surrounding the discovery of the 
white powder. 
Following the effective date of his resignation, Smulyan filed a complaint against 
the Liquidation Bureau in April 2010 with the New York State Office of the Inspector 
General (OIG). During the pendency of that complaint, Smulyan received periodic 
updates from OIG staff.3 In October 2010, Smulyan learned that OIG had transferred 
the conduct of its investigation to the Liquidation Bureau's General Counsel and 
Assistant Special Deputy Superintendent. For the next few months, Smulyan's 
repeated phone calls and emails to the Liquidation Bureau's General Counsel and 
Assistant Special Deputy Superintendent went unanswered. 
In January, 2011 Smulyan filed separate unfair labor practice charges against the 
Liquidation Bureau and CSEA with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The 
NLRB's Region 2 dismissed both charges on March 31, 2011 because the NLRB lacks 
jurisdiction over public employers. In May 2011, the NLRB's Office of Appeals denied 
Smulyan's appeal of the dismissal of his charges. 
3
 During this period, Smulyan also had telephone conversations with CSEA attorneys 
about the handling of the November 2009 hearing and CSEA's failure to grieve the 
March 16, 2010 suspension. 
Case No. U-31050 - 5 -
DISCUSSION 
Pursuant to §204.1(a)(1) of the Rules, an improper practice charge must be filed 
within four months from the date that a charging party has actual or constructive 
knowledge of the act or acts that form the basis for the charge.4 The time period for 
filing a charge is not tolled by the pendency of a related claim in another forum.5 
In the present case, Smulyan's charge against the Liquidation Bureau is untimely 
because it was filed more than four months after he could have rescinded the 
severance agreement. The fact that Smulyan pursued a complaint with OIG and filed an 
unfair labor practice charge against the Liquidation Bureau with the NLRB did not toll 
the filing period under §204.1(a)(1) of the Rules. Even if we were to find the alleged 
failure of the Liquidation Bureau's. General Counsel and Assistant Special Deputy 
Superintendent to respond to Smulyan's communications concerning the OIG complaint 
to be cognizable under §209-a.1(c) of the Act, those allegations are untimely as well. 
Finally, Smulyan's allegations against CSEA are untimely because the charge 
was filed four months after the November 2009 hearing, and four months after CSEA 
refused to file grievances on his behalf. Smulyan's complaint to OIG and his unfair 
labor practice charge against CSEA did.not toll the time period for filing a charge under 
the Rules. ^ 
4
 New York State ThruwayAuth, 40 PERB1J3014 (2007); City of Oswego, 23 PERB 
H3007 (1990); CityofBinghamton, 31 PERB 1J3088 (1998). 
5
 State of New York (State University of New York at Stony Brook) (Cooper), 44 PERB . 
1J3021 (2011) pet dismissed, Cooper v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 44 PERB 
117012 (Sup Ct Albany County 2011); New York State ThruwayAuth, 40 PERBH3014 
(2007). 
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In the alternative, we would affirm the dismissal of the amended charge on the 
merits. According to Smulyan's allegations, the negative evaluations and his disputes 
with the Liquidation Bureau over those evaluations, preceded his 2008 and 2009 
grievances. While his grievances constitute protected activity under the Act, his charge 
fails to allege any additional facts that, if proven, would demonstrate that the Liquidation 
Bureau's subsequent actions toward him concerning his job performance violated §209-
a. 1(c) of the Act. 
We reach a similar conclusion concerning Smulyan's allegation about collusion 
between the Liquidation Bureau and CSEA at the November 2009 hearing. His 
allegations concerning CSEA's representation at that hearing, if proven, are insufficient 
to demonstrate that the Liquidation Bureau violated §209-a. 1 (b) of the Act.6 
Smulyan's allegations against the Liquidation Bureau concerning the March 2010 
suspension, the severance agreement and his subsequent complaint to OIG are equally 
deficient. According to the amended charge, the event that triggered his suspension 
and resignation was the March 16, 2010 report about his discovery of a possibly toxic 
white powder in his work area that turned out to be salt. While a health and safety 
report by an employee under certain facts and circumstances may constitute protected 
activity for purposes of the Act,7 the amended charge does not allege any facts that 
6
 In his May 24, 2011 amendment to his charge, Smulyan alleges that CSEA 
representatives tricked him into not submitting certain documents to the hearing officer. 
Attached to his May 26, 2011 amendment, however, Smulyan submitted a December 
14, 2009 email he sent to the Liquidation Bureau's Chief Human Resources Officer 
alleging that his CSEA representatives prohibited him from speaking about certain 
issues at the hearing. 
7
 Hudson Valley Comm Coll, 25 PERB P039 (1992). 
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would demonstrate his report was related to forming, joining or participating in an 
employee organization.8 Furthermore, the alleged facts surrounding his resignation are 
insufficient to prove that the Liquidation Bureau constructively discharged him in 
violation of the Act.9 The facts and circumstances of Smulyan's OIG complaint following 
his resignation are also insufficient to state a claim of improperly motivated retaliation 
under the Act. 
Finally, the amended charge does not allege sufficient facts that might 
demonstrate that CSEA violated §209-a.2(c) of the Act. The amended charge does not 
include sufficient factual allegations to demonstrate that CSEA's refusals to process 
grievances on behalf of Smulyan were discriminatory, arbitrary or in bad faith. In 
addition, Smulyan's dissatisfaction with the tactical decisions made by CSEA in 
representing him at the November 2009 hearing does not state a claim of a breach of 
the duty of fair representation.10 
8
 County of Tioga, 44 PERB1J3016 (2011). In contrast, Smulyan's report might 
constitute protected activity under Civ Ser Law §75-b as a necessary preliminary 
notification to the Liquidation Bureau of what he reasonably believed constituted a 
substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety. PERB, however, lacks 
jurisdiction over retaliation claims premised upon Civ Ser Law §75-b. 
9
 Holland Patent Cent Sch Dist, 32 PERB 1J3041 (1999); State of New York (SUNY 
Oswego), 36 PERB TJ3015 (2003), confirmed sub nom. CSEA v New York State Pub 
Empl Rel Bd, 8 AD3d 796, 37 PERB 1J7002 (3d Dept 2004). See also, Morris v. 
Schroder Capital Mgt Intl, 7 NY3d 626, 621 (2006)("Constructive discharge occurs 
'when the employer, rather than acting directly, deliberately makes an employee's 
working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary 
resignation.'") 
10
 Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1056 (Lefevre), 43 PERB 1J3027 (2010). 
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Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the Director's decision to dismiss the 
charge. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: January 24, 2012 
Albany, New York 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF CHENANGO and CHENANGO 
COUNTY SHERIFF, 
Charging Party, CASE NO. U-30738 
- and -
CHENANGO COUNTY LAW ENFORCEMENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Respondent. 
HANCOCK ESTABROOK, LLP (JOHN F. CORCORAN of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
JOHN M, CROTTY, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Chenango County Law 
Enforcement Association, Inc. (Association), to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ)1 on an improper practice charge filed by County of Chenango and 
Chenango County Sheriff (Joint Employer) alleging that the Association violated §209-
a.2(b) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by submitting certain 
proposals to interest arbitration. The Association has filed exceptions limited to the ALJ's 
conclusion concerning Association Proposal #4 - Dues Deductions, Association Proposal 
#8 - Holiday, and Association Proposal #15 - Workers' Compensation. 
1
 43 PERB H4592(2011). 
2
 The content of each proposal is fully set forth in the ALJ's decision. Supra, note 1, 43 
PERB fl4592 at 4805 and 4807. 
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DISCUSSION 
In Orange County Deputy Sheriff's Police Benevolent Association, Inc3 (County 
of Orange), we reiterated that the applicable test for determining whether a particular 
demand is directly related to compensation, and therefore arbitrable under §209.4(g) of 
the Act, is the one first articulated in New York State Police Investigators Association4 
(State Police): 
The degree of a demand's relationship to compensation is 
measured by the characteristic of the demand. If the sole, 
predominant or primary characteristic of the demand is 
compensation, then it is arbitrable because the demand to 
that extent directly relates to compensation. A demand has 
compensation as its sole, predominant or primary 
characteristic only when it seeks to effect some change in 
amount or level of compensation by either payment from the 
State to or on behalf of an employee or the modification of 
an employee's financial obligation arising from the 
employment relationship (e.g., a change in an insurance 
copayment).5 [Emphasis in original.] •< : 
In the present case, Association Proposal #4 - Dues Deduction seeks to amend 
the parties' agreement to add the subject of an agency shop fee deduction. The ALJ 
concluded that the proposal was not arbitrable based upon Ulster County Deputy 
Sheriffs Police Benevolent Association, Inc (County of Ulster).6 
In County of Ulster, the Board ruled that proposals concerning membership dues 
and agency shop fees deductions are not arbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act because 
3
 44 PERB H3023(2011). 
4
 30 PERB 1J3013 (1997), confirmed sub nom., New York State Police Investigators 
Assn v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 30 PERB 1)7011 (Sup Ct Albany 
County 1997). 
5
 Supra, note 4, 30 PERB 1J3013 at 3028. 
6
 38 PERB 1J3033 (2005). 
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they did not "meet the test for compensation" due to a lack of a "nexus between the 
dues deduction and the unit members' relationship to the County."7. It is notable that 
the Board in County of Ulster did not rely upon the statutory language of §209.4(g) of 
the Act or the State Police test in reaching its conclusions. 
Following careful review, we reverse County of Ulster, and find that Association 
Proposal #4 - Dues Deduction is arbitrable because it is directly related to 
compensation under §209.4(g) of the Act. By definition, a mandatory agency fee 
deduction decreases the level of compensation received by unit employees from the 
Joint Employer and places a financial obligation on an employee arising out of his or 
her employment.8 In reversing County of Ulster, we are very mindful of the importance 
of stare decisis in public sector labor relations. Nevertheless, we are obligated to 
correct erroneous interpretations of law when to do so is necessary to effectuate the 
policies of the Act, which are set by the Legislature.9 
7
 Supra, note 6, 38 PERB at 3114. 
8
 In reaching our decision today, we note that the at-issue agency shop fee proposal 
does not include precise contractual language. Therefore, we do not have to reach the 
question of whether an agency shop fee proposal that does not include a refund 
procedure equivalent to that set forth in Civ Ser Law §208.3(b) of the Act is mandatory, 
permissive or prohibited under the Act. See generally, Abood v Detroit Bd of Ed, 
431 US 209 (1977); Chicago Teachers Union, Local No 1, AFT, AFL-CIO v Hudson, 475 
US 292, 19 PERB 1J7502 (1986); Lehnert v Ferris Faculty Assn, 500 US 507, 24 PERB 
1J7530 (1991); Locke v Karass, 555 US 207, 42 PERB 1J7501 (2009). 
9
 Orange County Deputy Sheriff's PBA, Inc, supra, note 3; Manhasset Union Free Sch 
Dist, 41 PERB 1J3005 (2008), confirmed and mod, in part, 61 AD3d 1231, 42 PERB 
117004 (3d Dept 2009), on remittitur, 42 PERB H3016.(2009); City of Cohoes, 31 PERB 
113020 (1998), confirmed sub nom., Uniformed Firefighters of Cohoes, Local 2562 v 
Cuevas, 32 PERB H7026 (Sup Ct Albany County 1999), affd, 276 AD2d 184, 33 PERB 
H7019 (3d Dept 2000) Iv denied, 96 NY2d 711 (2001); County of Orange, 14 PERB 
113060(1981). 
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Next, we turn to the Association's exception to the ALJ's conclusion that 
Association Proposal #8 - Holiday is not arbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act. In County 
of Orange,™ we reaffirmed that when a unitary demand contains an inseparable 
nonarbitrable component, it does not satisfy the arbitrability test under §209.4(g) of the 
Act.11 In the present case, we affirm the.ALJ's conclusion that Association Proposal #8 
- Holiday is a unitary demand that seeks to increase the number of paid holidays and to 
obligate the Joint Employer to pay unit employees overtime for working those holidays. 
Finally, we affirm the ALJ's conclusion that Association Proposal #15 - Workers' 
Compensation is nonmandatory and, therefore, not arbitrable because the demand 
would deprive the Joint Employer of its statutory right to make initial General Municipal 
Law §207-c eligibility determinations.12 Contrary to the Association's argument, an 
employer's right to make an initial determination is not limited to making "a decision . 
upon the stated condition" of an employee.13 Under GML §207-c an employer may 
require an employee who seeks benefits to undergo a medical examination in order to 
determine that the alleged injury or illness occurred in the performance of duty. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Association withdraw from interest 
arbitration the following: Proposal #2 - Association Business Leave; Proposal #8 -
Holiday; Proposal #11 - Sick Leave, §§18.04, 18.06, and 18.07; Proposal #12 -
10
 Supra, note 3. 
11
 See also, Sullivan County PBA, 39 PERB P034 (2006); Tompkins County Deputy 
Sheriffs Assn, Inc, 44 PERB 1J3024 (2011). 
12See, City of Watertown v New York Pub EmpI Rel Bd, 95 NY2d 73, 33 PERB fl7007 
(2000); Schenectady PBA v New York State Pub EmpI Rel Bd, 85 NY2d 480, 28 PERB 
117005(1995). 
13
 Brief in Support of Exceptions, p. 6. 
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Vacation Banking Policy; Proposal #13 - Personal Leave Business; and Proposal #15 
Workers' Compensation. 
DATED: January 24, 2012 
Albany, New York 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DISTRICT COUNCIL 37, AMERICAN FEDERATION 
OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, 
AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-30279 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent. 
MARY J. O'CONNELL, GENERAL COUNSEL (MEAGHEAN MURPHY ESQ., 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
DAVID BRODSKY, DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS AND COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING (SETH J. BLAU, of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon our review of the exceptions filed by the Board of Education of the 
City School District of the City of New York (District) to the decision of an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ),1 and the response filed by District Council 37, American Federation of 
State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (AFSCME), we reverse the decision 
of the ALJ, which finds that the District violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when it eliminated the 5:30 a.m.-1:30 p.m. shift for 
employees in the title of loader and handler at its warehouse in Long Island City. 
FACTS 
Employees in the title of loader and handler at the District's warehouse make 
regular supply deliveries to District schools for approximately 8 of the 17 truck delivery 
routes. Prior to July 2010, the loaders and handlers worked one of two daily shifts: 5:30 
a.m.-1:30 pm or 6:00 a.m.-2:00 p.m. The two shifts were necessary to ensure sufficient 
'44 PERB U4580(2011). 
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time for a seniority-based selection of assignments, with the selection process 
occupying approximately V* hour of each shift. Sixty percent of the employees worked 
the 5:30 a.m.-1:30 p.m. shift and received an extra Vi hour of the contractual shift 
differential than those who started work at 6:00 a.m. In June 2010, the District 
decreased from two to one, the number of loaders and handlers assigned to each 
delivery truck for the approximate 8 routes. As a result of that decision, the District laid 
off 10 of the 43 loaders and handlers. In July 2010, the District eliminated the 5:30 a.m.-
1:30 p.m. shift based upon its conclusion that the shift was no longer operationally 
necessary because there were fewer loaders and handlers to select assignments. 
DISCUSSION 
Under the Act, staffing and the level of services provided by an employer are 
managerial prerogatives, and therefore, nonmandatory subjects.2 In the present case, it 
is undisputed that the District made an operational determination to eliminate the shift 
commencing at 5:30 a.m. based upon the reduction in staffing and driving assignments 
obviating the need for two VT. hour periods for selection of assignments. Therefore, we 
reverse the ALJ's decision, and dismiss the charge.3 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the charge is dismissed. 
DATED: January 24, 2012 
Albany, New York /J 
//Jerome Lefkowitz/Chairp^rson 
t^Qj-
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
2
 See, City of White Plains, 5 PERB1J3008 (1972); Town of Blooming Grove, 21 PERB 
U3032 (1989); Starpoint Cent Sch Dist, 23 PERB 1J3012 (1990). 
3
 Our decision in County of Rockland and Rockland County Sheriff, 27 PERB 1J3019 
(1994) is inapposite to the present one. In that case, there was no evidence presented 
that the change in the starting and ending times was the result in a reduction in staffing 
or a modification in the services provided by the employer. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JOHN N. SCOURAKIS, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-31251 
- and -
STATE OF NEW YORK (STATE UNIVERSITY 
OF NEW YORK) and PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
FEDERATION, 
Respondents. 
STEPHEN D. HANS, P.C., for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by John N. Scourakis 
(Scourakis) to a decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) dismissing as untimely an amended improper practice charge 
originally filed on August 2, 2011, which alleges that the State of New York (State 
University of New York) (State) violated §209-a.1(c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) and that the Public Employees Federation (PEF) violated §209-
a.2(c)oftheAct.1 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
In considering Scourakis's exceptions with respect to the timeliness of his 
1
 44 PERB 1J4482 (2011). Neither PEF nor the State filed responses to the exceptions. 
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amended charge, we assume the truth of the factual allegations.2 Our decision, 
however, is limited to the timeliness of the particular allegations cited by Scourakis in 
his exceptions concerning the actions by the State and PEF in scheduling an arbitration 
for October 5, 2011. 
On July 28, 2009, Scourakis was served with a notice of discipline by the State 
after he asserted a contractual right to PEF representation during an interrogation 
concerning a June 14, 2009 incident. Scourakis filed a grievance challenging the notice 
of discipline. On December 18, 2009, the State issued a second notice of discipline 
seeking a proposed nine-month suspension in retaliation for Scourakis' filing grievances 
with PEF, demanding PEF representation during an interrogation and reporting patient 
safety issues. Scourakis grieved this notice of discipline, as well. 
On May 4, 2010, Scourakis received a third notice of discipline seeking his 
discharge premised upon an alleged incident on February 17, 2010. After Scourakis 
filed a grievance, an agency-level meeting was held on October 26, 2010, and a 
decision was issued on November 9, 2010. Unbeknownst to Scourakis at the time, 
however, PEF did not file a timely demand for arbitration.3 On May 19, 2011, Scourakis 
learned from a PEF attorney that the State intended to summarily terminate him on the 
ground that PEF failed to file a timely demand for arbitration with respect to the third 
notice of discipline. Scourakis was terminated the following day. In mid-July, 2011, 
2
 Board ofEduc of the, City Sch Distofthe City of New York (Grassel), 43 PERB1J3010 
(2010). 
3
 In Case No. U-31227, which is pending before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), 
Scourakis alleges that PEF's conduct concerning the third notice of discipline violated 
its duty of fair representation under the Act. 
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Scourakis learned that the State-and PEF intended to schedule an arbitration on 
October 5, 2011 concerning the two 2009 notices of discipline that had remained 
dormant for over a year. 
DISCUSSION 
Pursuant to §204.1(a)(1) of the Rules of Procedure, an improper practice charge 
must be filed within four months from the date that a charging party has actual or 
constructive knowledge of the act or acts that form the basis for the charge.4 In the 
present case, Scourakis filed his charge within four months of learning that the State 
and PEF intended to schedule an arbitration concerning the two 2009 notices of 
discipline. Therefore, we conclude that the amended charge is. timely to the extent it 
alleges that the State violated §209-a.1(c) of the Act and that PEF violated §209-a.2(c) 
of the Act by taking action in mid-July 2011 to schedule the arbitration with respect to 
the 2009 notices of discipline. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the amended charge is reinstated and the 
case remanded to the Director for further processing consistent with this decision. 
DATED: January 24, 2012 
Albany, New York /) 
//Jerome Lefkowitz^Chairpejjson 
^2. 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
4
 New York State Thruway Auth, 40 PERB P014 (2007); City of Oswego, 23 PERB 
P0Q7 (1990); City of Binghamton, 31 PERB H3088 (1998). 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and-
CASE NO. U-29935 
COUNTY OF ST. LAWRENCE, 
Respondent. 
STEVEN A. CRAIN and DAREN J. RYLEWICZ, DEPUTY CO-COUNSEL 
(PAUL S. BAMBERGER of counsel), for Charging Party 
MICHAEL C. CROWE, COUNTY ATTORNEY, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Upon our review of the exceptions by the County of St. Lawrence (County) to the 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), and the response by the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA), we affirm the 
ALJ's conclusion that the County violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) for the reasons set forth in the ALJ's decision.1 The County 
violated the Act by announcing to current employees a change in a binding past 
practice by freezing the level of reimbursement of Medicare Part B premiums to current 
employees and their spouses, for unit employees who retire on or before December 31, 
2010, and discontinuing that benefit for unit employees who retire after December 31, 
2010,2 
1
 44 PERB H4518 (2011). 
2
 See, Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist, 43 PERB1J3017 (2010). See also, Aeneas 
McDonald PBA v City of Geneva, 92 NY2d 326, 331-332, 31 PERB 1R503 at 7505 
(1998). 
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the County: 
1. Rescind its February 3, 2010 announcement freezing the level of 
reimbursement of Medicare Part B premiums to current employees 
and their spouses once they are retired and discontinuing the 
benefit for future retirees; 
2. Reimburse, with interest at the maximum legal rate, any employee 
who retired on or before December 31, 2010 and who was eligible 
to receive Medicare Part B for the difference, if any, between the 
premium amount for Medicare Part B in effect on January 1, 2010 
and the premium amount for which they received reimbursement 
after January 1, 2010; 
3. Reimburse, with interest at the maximum legal rate, any employee 
who retired after December 31, 2010 and who was eligible to 
receive Medicare Part B, for the full cost of the Medicare Part B 
premium then in effect; and 
4. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations used to 
communicate both in writing and electronically with unit employees. 
DATED: January 24, 2012 
Albany, New York ' . 
MA p V f T W - . 
Jerome Lefkowpfz, Chairperson 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of St. Lawrence in the unit 
represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO that the County of St. Lawrence will: 
1. Rescind its February 3, 2010 announcement freezing the level of 
reimbursement of Medicare Part B premiums to current employees and their 
spouses once they are retired and discontinuing the benefit for future retirees; 
2. Reimburse, with interest at the maximum legal rate, any employee who retired 
on or before December 31, 2010 and who was eligible to receive Medicare 
. Part B for the difference, if any, between the premium amount for Medicare 
Part B in effect on January 1, 2010 and the premium amount for which they 
received reimbursement after January 1,2010; and 
3. Reimburse, with interest at the maximum legal rate, any employee who retired 
after December 31, 2010 and who was eligible to receive Medicare Part B, for 
the full cost of the Medicare Part B premium then in effect. 
Dated By 
on behalf of County of St. Lawrence 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must 
not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LANCASTER STEWART, 
Charging Party, 
- and -
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, 
AFL-CIO, CASE NO. U-30798 
Respondent, 
- and - • 
STATE OF NEW YORK (STATE INSURANCE 
DEPARTMENT), 
Employer. 
LANCASTER STEWART, pro se 
WILLIAM P. SEAMON, GENERAL COUNSEL (EDWARD J. ALUCK of 
counsel), for Respondent 
MICHAEL N.VOLFORTE, ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL (RONALD S. 
EHRLICH of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Lancaster Stewart (Stewart) to 
a determination, dated May 10, 2011, by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) denying Stewart's efforts to rescind his April 29, 2011 request to 
withdraw an improper practice charge he filed alleging that the Public Employees 
Federation, AFL-CIQ (PEF) violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) when it denied his request to seek the vacatur of an arbitration award pursuant to 
CPLR Article 75. The State of New York (State Insurance Department) (State) is a statutory 
party to the charge pursuant to § 209-a.3 of the Act. 
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) 
EXCEFQONS 
In his exceptions, Stewart asserts that he should have been permitted to rescind his 
withdrawal request before the Director accepted the withdrawal because: he signed the 
withdrawal request form in error; he sought to rescind the withdrawal one business day after 
he signed the form and before the withdrawal request was received by the Director; he had 
an unfettered right to rescind the withdrawal request; and the collateral estoppel defense 
plead in PEF's answer is without merit. 
Both PEF and the State oppose the exceptions on the ground that the Director acted 
properly in denying the rescission request. In addition, PEF contends that the Director's 
actions concerning the withdrawal request are not subject to exceptions under §213.2 of the 
) Rules of Procedure (Rules) and that Stewart cannot demonstrate that PEF violated the duty 
of fair representation.1 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On or about January 5, 2011, Stewart filed an improper practice charge, Case No. 
- U-30693, alleging PEF violated §209-a.2(c) of the Act when a PEF attorney, during an 
arbitration in April, June and July, 2010, failed to contact certain witnesses identified by 
Stewart and made tactical decisions that Stewart disagreed with. In addition, the charge 
alleged that PEF violated the duty of fair representation by refusing to commence a special 
proceeding pursuant CPLR §7511 to vacate an October 14, 2010 arbitration award, which 
was allegedly based upon perjured testimony and fraudulent documents. 
During the initial processing of Stewart's charge the Director conducted a facial 
i 1 On January 23, 2012, Stewart faxed a letter to the Board seeking an "adjournment" of the 
case. Our Rules are silent concerning a party requesting to adjourn a case scheduled for 
consideration by the Board, and Stewart has failed to present any reason why the Board 
should delay deciding his exceptions. Accordingly, we deny Stewart's request. 
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examination of the allegations consistent with §204.1(a) of the Rules. On January 13, 2011, 
• the Director sent Stewart a letter stating that his charge would not be processed due to 
deficiencies outlined in an attached deficiency notice and providing Stewart with an 
opportunity to correct those deficiencies through an amendment. On January 26, 2011, 
Stewart filed an unsworn amendment asserting additional allegations in support of his 
charge. Following a review of the amendment, the Director issued a decision on February 
4, 2011 dismissing the charge on the ground that the charge remained deficient.2 In his 
decision, the Director concluded that the allegations concerning PEF's representation during 
the arbitration was time-barred, and that the allegation concerning PEF's failure to 
commence litigation to vacate the arbitration award was deficient because Stewart failed to 
) plead that PEF had'commenced similar litigation on behalf of others. 
Stewart did not file exceptions to the Director's decision. Instead, on or about 
February 21, 2011, he filed the present charge alleging again that PEF's representation 
during the arbitration violated §209-a.2(c) of the Act, and that PEF violated the duty of fair 
representation by refusing to commence a judicial proceeding seeking to vacate the 
arbitration award. In support of the latter claim, Stewart attached excerpts from two court 
decisions in which it appears that PEF was a party in litigation concerning the vacatur of 
arbitration awards with respect to others. Following his review, the Director processed the 
new charge but only to the extent it alleged that PEF violated §209-a.2(c) of the Act by 
failing to commence litigation to vacate the arbitration award with respect to Stewart.3 
• PEF filed an answer that denied that it breached the duty of fair representation and 
) 2 44 PERB H4516(2011). 
3
 The Director found that the Stewart's allegations concerning PEF's representation at the 
arbitration were untimely. 
' ^ 
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asserted various defenses including collateral estoppel, premised upon the Director's 
dismissal of Stewart's earlier charge in Case No. U-30693. In its answer, the State also 
asserted that Stewart was collaterally estopped from pursuing his charge based upon the 
Director's prior decision. 
A pre-hearing conference was held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on April 
29, 2011. At the pre-hearing conference, Stewart appeared pro se and PEF and the State 
were represented by counsel. It is undisputed that during the pre-hearing conference 
before the ALJ, Stewart signed PERB's form requesting that his charge be withdrawn.4 
On May 2, 2011, Stewart faxed a letter to the ALJ to rescind his withdrawal request. 
Two days later, Stewart faxed a letter directly to the Director rescinding the withdrawal. In 
) his letter to the Director, Stewart stated that the April 29, 2011 withdrawal request resulted 
from discussions at the conference that led him to mistakenly believe that he would be 
unable to prevail in his charge in light of PEF's collateral estoppel defense. He further 
explained that he wanted to proceed with his charge because his subsequent research 
convinced him that his charge had merit. PEF submitted a letter objecting to Stewart's 
rescission request. 
On May 10, 2011, the Director issued a letter denying Stewart's requests to rescind 
his April 29, 2011 request to withdraw the charge, and approved that withdrawal request. 
DISCUSSION 
We begin with PEF's contention that Stewart does not have a right to file exceptions 
to the Director's May 10, 2011 letter pursuant to §213.2 of the Rules. Contrary to PEF's 
i — : 
1
 A 
There are conflicting allegations made by the parties concerning the discussions that took 
place at the pre-hearing conference. It is unnecessary, however, for us to resolve those 
conflicts in reaching our decision. 
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argument, the rulings contained in the Director's letter are clearly reviewable under §213.2 
of the Rules, which permits parties to file timely exceptions with the Board, to "a decision, -
report, order, ruling or other appealable findings or conclusions." 
Next, we turn to the merits of Stewart's exceptions. Section 204.1(d) of the Rules 
states, in relevant part: 
The charge may be withdrawn by the charging party before 
the issuance of the dispositive decision and recommended 
order based thereon upon approval by the director. 
Thereafter, the improper practice proceeding may be 
discontinued only with the approval of the board. Requests 
to the director to withdraw an improper practice charge or to 
the board to discontinue an improper practice proceeding will 
be approved unless to do so would be inconsistent with the 
purposes and policies of the act or due process of law. 
Whenever the director approves the withdrawal of a charge, 
or the board approves the discontinuation of a proceeding, 
the case will be closed without consideration or review of any 
of the issues raised by the charge. 
Based upon its explicit terms, §204.1(d) of the Rules limits the right of a charging 
party to unilaterally withdraw a charge.5 Under the Rule, all withdrawal requests are subject 
to approval and will not be approved if it is determined that the withdrawal would be 
inconsistent with the policies of the Act or due process. In contrast, the Rule does not 
dictate when a charging party must request to withdraw a charge nor does it prohibit a • 
charging party from changing his or her mind prior to a withdrawal request being approved. 
Following approval of a withdrawal request, however, rescission of a withdrawal will be 
granted only in extremely limited circumstances.6 
In the present case, Stewart's withdrawal was not connected with a settlement 
5
 See, PEF (Leemhuis), 17 PERB P037 (1984). 
6
 PEF (Farkas) 15 PERB P020 (1982); UFT(Fearon), 33 PERB fl3003 (2000). 
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agreement under which he would receive consideration for his withdrawal. In addition, his 
written recession was submitted within one business day of signing the withdrawal request 
and before the Director received the signed withdrawal request from the ALJ. Under these 
facts and circumstances, we conclude that the Director erred in rejecting Stewart's timely 
rescission, which rendered the withdrawal request null and void. 
Therefore, we grant Stewart's exceptions, in part, by reopening the case and 
remanding it to the Director for further processing consistent with our decision.7 Nothing in 
this decision shall preclude the Director or an ALJ from applying his or her discretion to 
require the parties to submit offers of proof aimed at clarifying any facts in dispute 
concerning the merits of the charge. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge is hereby reopened, and the 
case remanded to the Director for further processing. 
DATED: January 24, 2012 
Albany, New York 
\J/t/HrynsL^. • (f-yt/lfaun,-
//Jerome Lefkowitz, C^?airpers 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
7
 Upon remand, PEF's collateral estoppel.defense should be evaluated based upon our 
decision in MaBSTOA, 40 PERB 1J3023 (2007). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PROFESSIONAL, CLERICAL, TECHNICAL 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
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- and -
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Buffalo City School 
District (District) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper 
practice charge filed by the Professional, Clerical, Technical Employees Association 
(Association) finding that the District violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally subcontracted exclusively performed on-site 
computer help desk services.1 
FACTS 
The relevant facts are fully set forth in the ALJ's decision. They are repeated here 
only as necessary to address the District's exceptions. 
The record reveals that in December 2004, the District entered into a contract 
143PERB.jf4627(2011). ' 
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with Administrative Assistants Limited (AAL) for the licensing, implementation and 
service of eSIS, which is a web-based software system for the processing of data, 
including grades, schedules and admissions/withdrawals. Prior to implementation of 
eSIS, the District used a BOCES educational computer system known as Student 
Information System (SIS) for similar purposes. While the District was using SIS, 
BOCES provided an off-site help desk for District employees, as well as for employees 
of other school districts, to answer questions concerning the use of that software. It is 
undisputed that Association unit members never worked at BOCES' SIS help desk. 
Under the terms of the District-AAL contract, the District is responsible for 
maintaining an on-site help desk to answer routine questions from District employees 
concerning the day-to-day operations of the eSIS system. When a question is more 
technical or complicated in nature, the District help desk is authorized to seek 
assistance from an off-site help desk staffed by AAL employees. After the District failed 
to establish an on-site help desk by January 2006, it entered into a temporary services 
contract with AAL to staff the help desk for the period January-June 2006. 
In June 2006, the District reassigned Association unit member Minnie Bell (Bell) 
to work at the on-site eSIS help desk in City Hall. Upon her reassignment, Bell engaged 
in self-study concerning eSIS, and she received on-the job training from an on-site AAL 
implementation specialist by observing that AAL employee answering eSIS questions 
from District employees. 
All District secondary schools began utilizing the eSIS system at the beginning of 
the 2006-07 school year. In September 2006, Bell started receiving, answering and 
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documenting eSIS questions at the on-site help desk. These inquiries concerned 
routine issues like logging-in and scheduling. She also began communicating with the 
AAL off-site help desk concerning more complicated questions. 
The AAL implementation specialist worked with Bell at the on-site help desk until 
October 2006. On occasion, the AAL implementation specialist would answer calls in 
addition to Bell. Thereafter, Bell became solely responsible for responding to eSIS 
questions. In November 2006, the District moved the eSIS help desk into the City Hall 
room where it maintained a similar help desk, staffed by Association unit members., who 
were exclusively responsible for answering questions from District employees 
concerning computer-related problems unrelated to eSIS. As part of her duties, Bell 
was responsible for documenting questions received and her responsive actions on the 
same District system used by the Association unit members who work at the other 
District help desk. In July 2007, Bell stopped exclusively performing the duties of the 
eSIS help desk when the District reassigned the duties to employees of a private 
contractor. 
DISCUSSION 
The District's exceptions are limited to assertions that the ALJ erred in defining 
the at-issue work, and in concluding that the Association's exclusive performance of the 
work for nine months is in sufficient to establish exclusivity under the Act. 
Under Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority (Niagara Frontier),2 there are 
two essential initial questions that must be determined in deciding whether the transfer 
218PERBP083(1985). 
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of unit work violates §209-a.1 (d) of the Act: a) was the at-issue work exclusively •" 
performed by unit employees for a sufficient period of time to have become binding; and 
b) was the work assigned to nonunit personnel substantially similar to that exclusive unit 
work. If both these questions are answered in the affirmative, we will find a violation of 
§209-a.1(d) of. the Act unless there is a significant change in job qualifications. 
In Manhasset Union Free School District,3 we held that in determining the scope 
of unit work and the exclusivity of that work under the Act, the following past practice 
test is applicable: the "practice was unequivocal and was continued uninterrupted for a 
period of time sufficient under the circumstances to create a reasonable expectation 
among the affected unit employees that the [practice] would continue."4 In addition, we 
identified the following criteria, discerned from prior precedent, as providing guidance 
for determining whether a discernible boundary exists in transfer of unit work cases: 
the nature and frequency of the work performed, the 
geographic location where the work is performed, the 
employer's explicit or implicit rationale for the practice, and 
other facts establishing that the at-issue work has been 
treated as distinct from work performed by nonunit 
personnel.5 
Following our review of the record and the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
3
 41 PERB TJ3005 (2008), confirmed and mod, in part, Manhasset Union Free Sch Distv 
New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 61 AD3d 1231, 42 PERB 1J7004 (3d Dept 2009), on 
remittitur, 42 PERB 1J3016 (2009). 
4
 Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist, 40 PERB H3012, at 3046-3047(2007) (quoting from 
County of Nassau, 24 PERB 1J3029 [1991])(subsequent history omitted). 
5
 Supra, note 3, 41 PERB P005 at 3025. 
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ALJ's definition of the at-issue work as the duties associated with on-site help desks 
concerning computer questions from District employees. This definition is supported by 
placement of the eSIS help desk in the same location as the other help desk, where 
Association unit members provided very similar computer-related services to District 
employees. It is also supported by the fact that the Association unit members assigned 
to both help desks documented the computer-based inquiries received and their 
responses on the same District system. 
In City of New Rochelle,6 we noted that the Board has never identified a specific 
period that is required to establish exclusivity "because the sufficiency of the duration 
depends upon the circumstances of each particular fact pattern."7 In that case, we found 
that the exclusive performance of the at-issue duties for one year was sufficient to have 
become binding under the facts and circumstances. 
In the present case, we conclude that Bell's sole performance of the duties of the 
on-site eSIS help desk over the nine-month period is sufficient to demonstrate a binding 
past practice to establish exclusivity under the Act. Under the facts presented, there is 
sufficient evidence that a reasonable expectation was created that the practice of 
Association members performing the work exclusively would continue. 
Under the District-AAL contract, the District is obligated to maintain an on-site 
help desk to respond to routine inquiries concerning the eSIS system, and it reassigned 
Bell in June 2006 for that purpose. Following Bell's reassignment, the activities of AAL • 
644PERB 1J3002 (2011). 
7
 Supra, note 6, 44 PERB P002 at 3027. 
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employees at the help desk were transitional in nature, and primarily devoted to 
providing the necessary training for implementation of the system. After the eSIS 
system became operational for all District secondary schools in September 2006, Bell 
was responsible for performing the help desk duties. The AAL implementation 
specialist was present at the help desk until October 2006 chiefly to provide Bell with 
training and support. In addition, the District took specific actions aimed at integrating 
the eSIS help desk with the other help desk where Association unit members provided 
computer help desk services to District employees. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the District: 
1. Cease and desist from unilaterally transferring the exclusive bargaining unit 
work of providing on-site computer help desk services; 
2. Forthwith restore such work to the Association's bargaining unit; 
3. Forthwith reinstate Minnie Bell to her former position and make her whole for 
any wages and benefits lost as a result of the unilateral transfer of unit work 
with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate; 
4. Sign and post the attached notice in all locations normally used to 
communicate both in writing and electronically with unit employees. 
DATED: January 24, 2012 
Albany, New York /) 
Jerome Lefkpwitz, Chairperson 
1-sJ ^ 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Buffalo City School District in the unit 
represented by the Professional, Clerical, Technical Employees Association 
(Association) that the Buffalo City School District will: 
1. Not unilaterally transfer the exclusive bargaining unit work of providing on-site 
computer help desk services from the bargaining unit represented by the 
Association; 
2. Forthwith reinstate Minnie Bell to her former position; 
3. Make Minne Bell whole for any wages and benefits lost as a result of the 
unilateral transfer of unit work defined in paragraph one, above, with interest at 
the currently prevailing maximum legal rate; and 
4. Forthwith restore such work to the Association's bargaining unit. 
Dated By . . . . 
on behalf of Buffalo City School District 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, SPRINGS 
SCHOOL UNIT, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-30168 
- and -
SPRINGS UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
STEVEN A. CRAIN and DAREN J. RYLEWICZ, DEPUTY CO-COUNSEL 
(PAUL S. BAMBERGER of counsel), for Charging Party 
INGERMAN SMITH, LLP (NEIL M. BLOCK of counsel), for Respondent 
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE (ROBERT T. REILLY, ESQ and LAURA R. 
HALLAR, J.D., of counsel) for New York State United Teachers 
INTERIM BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Springs School Unit (CSEA) to a 
decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing a charge alleging that the 
Springs Union Free School District (District) violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by unilaterally transferring certain duties in the 
pre-kindergarten program previously performed exclusively by CSEA unit employees to 
a private contractor, and by mandating that certain unit employees remain on duty until 
dismissal time on the last day of the school year.1 
1
 44 PERB H4574(2011). 
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CSEA excepts to the ALJ's conclusion that the reassignment of pre-kindergarten 
program services to nonunit employees is a nonmandatory subject pursuant to 
Education Law §3602-e. CSEA also excepts to the ALJ's sustainment of the District's 
contract reversion defense concerning the discontinuance of a past practice permitting 
unit employees to leave early from work on the last day of school. The District supports 
the ALJ's decision. 
New York State United Teachers (NYSUT) has moved for leave to file an amicus 
curiae brief limited to the first issue raised in CSEA's exceptions: whether the provisions 
of Education Law §3602-e demonstrate a clear legislative intent that the transfer of pre-
kindergarten program duties is a nonmandatory subject of negotiations. In support of its 
motion, NYSUT states that a determination with respect to this legal issue will affect the 
collective negotiation rights of its members working in other pre-kindergarten programs 
throughout New York. In addition, NYSUT asserts that its proposed brief, submitted in 
support of its motion, presents supplemental legal authority and arguments concerning 
CSEA's charge.
 r 
While CSEA supports NYSUT's motion, the District does not. The District 
opposes the motion on the ground that a NYSUT affiliate, which allegedly represents 
District teachers, could have filed its own timely improper practice charge alleging that 
the at-issue transfer of work violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act because a pre-kindergarten 
teacher was also displaced by the District's unilateral action. 
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DISCUSSION 
Although our Rules of Procedure (Rules) are silent regarding motions for leave to 
file amicus curiae briefs, we have granted many such motions,2 and in some cases 
have invited amicus curiae briefs.3 
Participation by an amicus can enhance our deliberations by highlighting 
particular issues and presenting an alternative or supplemental legal analysis. The 
legal issue in the present case, whether Education Law §3602-e affects the mandatory 
negotiability of one of the subjects of CSEA's charge, has statewide importance for both 
employers and employees, and NYSUT's participation as an amicus might aid our 
deliberations. 
Contrary to the District's argument, NYSUT is not disqualified from participating 
as an amicus because one of its affiliates might have had standing to file its own charge 
against the District. The fact that such a charge was not filed is irrelevant to whether 
NYSUT should be granted amicus status but it is relevant to the scope of our remedial 
order under §205.5(d) of the Act, if we find merit to CSEA's exceptions. Based upon the 
foregoing, the motion by NYSUT for amicus status is granted. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that NYSUT may file an original and four copies 
of an amicus brief with the Board on or before February 7, 2012 with proof of service 
upon the CSEA and the District. CSEA and the District may file supplemental briefs, if 
2
 See, County of Suffolk, 44 PERB 1J3007 (2011); Brooklyn Excelsior Charter Sch, 43 
PERB H3004 (2010); City of New York, 40 PERB 1J3005 (2007); Greenburgh No 11 
Union Free Sch Dist, 32 PERB H3024 (1999). 
3
 Brooklyn Excelsior Charter Sch and Buffalo United Charter Sch, 44 PERB P001 
(2011); Highland Falls PBA, 42 PERB 1J3030 (2009); Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, 
41 PERB1J3005 (2008), confirmed and mod, in part, 61 AD3d 1231,42 PERB1J7004 
(3d Dept 2009), on remittitur, 42 PERB 1J3016 (2009). 
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necessary with the Board on or before March 7, 2012 in response to the arguments 
raised by NYSUT. 
DATED: January 24, 2012 
Albany, New York 
s Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-27650 
- and -
NANUET UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
STEVEN A. CRAIN and DAREN J. RYLEWICZ, DEPUTY CO-COUNSEL 
(MIGUEL ORTIZ, ESQ. of counsel), for Charging Party 
x KEANE&BEANE, P.C. (LANCE KLEIN, ESQ. of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an amended improper practice charge, 
originally filed on June 21, 2007, alleging that the Nanuet Union Free School District 
(District) violated §209-a. 1 (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when 
it unilaterally installed and. utilized a surveillance camera to monitor the conduct and 
work performance of a unit employee. 
Following a hearing, the ALJ issued a decision dismissing the charge on the 
ground that the District's action did not violate §209-a.1 (d) of the Act because the 
) subject of the charge was nonmandatory. The ALJ rejected the District's timeliness and 
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^, waiver defenses.1 
EXCEPTIONS 
CSEA excepts to the ALJ's conclusion that the District's installation and use of a 
surveillance camera to monitor a unit employee's conduct and work performance did riot 
violate §209-a. 1 (d) of the Act because the subject is nonmandatory. The District 
supports the ALJ's decision on the merits, but cross-excepts to the ALJ's rejection of its 
timeliness and waiver defenses. CSEA opposes the District's cross-exceptions. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ dismissing the charge, as modified. 
FACTS 
In 2005, the District decided to install a camera surveillance system inside and 
\ outside of its buildings to address security and safety issues. The decision was 
announced by Superintendent of Schools McNeill (McNeill) at a public meeting held in 
September 2005. The subject of interior and exterior cameras was briefly mentioned in . 
a multi-page attachment to the minutes of that public meeting. 
In Fall 2005, Ronald Longo (Longo), the District's labor counsel, told CSEA Labor 
Relations Specialist Steve Chanowski (Chanowski) of the District's decision to install the 
surveillance system. Longo explained to Chanowski that the surveillance cameras 
would be placed only in public locations inside and outside of District buildings. Longo 
assured Chanowski that, in order to protect employee privacy, no cameras would be 
installed inside break rooms or lunch rooms. Longo also told Chanowski that images 
• captured by the surveillance cameras might lead to the District's pursuit of disciplinary 
charges against unit employees. Chanowski shared the substance of this conversation 
j 
1
 43 PERB H4591 (2010). 
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with his supervisor, CSEA Region Director James Farina (Farina), and also informed 
Farina that he did not plan to request impact negotiations with the District concerning 
the subject. 
Installation of the necessary wiring and equipment for the camera surveillance 
system began in November 2005, with the knowledge of CSEA unit officers. During that 
month, CSEA unit officers began discussing various issues associated with the District's 
decision to install surveillance cameras, including the type of cameras the District would 
be utilizing, where the cameras would be placed, and what rights unit employees had 
concerning the surveillance. Among the CSEA officers who participated in the 
discussions were Head Custodians Joseph Zippilli (Zippilli), Thomas Magalars 
(Magalars) and Michael Scofield (Scofield). 
During a conversation between CSEA Region Director Farina and District 
attorney Longo in late November or early December 2005, Longo reiterated the 
District's intent to conduct camera surveillance only in public locations and to take 
appropriate action against unit employees based on any incriminating evidence 
gathered from the surveillance. Farina testified that he did not recall whether Longo had 
discussed the District's use of a camera to observe a specific unit employee. 
On February 16, 2006, the District and CSEA representatives again discussed 
the planned camera surveillance during a meeting in the office of Assistant 
Superintendent for Business Philip Sions (Sions). At the meeting, the District refused a 
demand from CSEA Southern Region 3 President Billy Riccaldo (Riccaldo) that it 
identify the specific locations where the cameras would be placed but District 
representatives reiterated that the cameras would not be located in break rooms or 
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bathrooms.2 After Farina learned about Riccaldo's information demand, Farina told 
Longo that he did not believe that the District was obligated to provide CSEA with 
information about the specific locations of the cameras. It is undisputed that the District 
never provided CSEA with the information sought by Riccaldo. 
On or about May 2006, installation of the District's camera surveillance system 
was completed. According to Superintendent Mark McNeill (McNeill) the surveillance 
system was building-based with the cameras networked to a central computer located in 
a room in each building. Each camera captures images for up to 15 days and those 
recorded images are viewable by individuals with access to the surveillance network 
computer. The interior cameras are inside softball-size black bubbles located in 
hallways and other public areas in District buildings including Highview Elementary 
School (Highview) where Zippilli works as Head Custodian. Although they were aware 
that the each black bubble may contain at least one surveillance camera, Zippilli and 
Magalars did not know the direction the cameras faced, the scope of the images 
captured or.the periods of the cameras'operation. 
During a May 2006 conversation about the status of the installation of the 
surveillance cameras, Longo informed CSEA representative Chanowski that it was 
probable that one camera would be placed in Highview to monitor Head Custodian 
Zippilli's work performance. The District's decision to utilize a surveillance camera for 
the purpose of monitoring Zippilli's performance was part of an ongoing District 
investigation of Zippilli dating back to 2005. The investigation was undertaken after 
2
 To reach our decision today, it is unnecessary for us resolve certain conflicts in the 
testimony of District and CSEA witnesses concerning whether the District stated at the 
meeting that it intended to utilize the surveillance cameras for disciplinary purposes. It 
is undisputed that the District had previously expressed that intent to CSEA 
representatives Farina and Chanowski. 
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Highview's principal received complaints that the school was not being kept clean 
because Zippilli was spending too much time in the school's custodial office located in 
the basement, instead of performing his job duties. 
The District hired a private investigator from Cobra Security to conduct the 
investigation of Zippilli. At the District's request, in May 2006, the private investigator 
placed a narrow concealed motion-activated camera in a pipe with the lens facing the 
common area of the hallway outside the custodial room in Highview's basement. The 
custodial room is utilized by Zippilli and other CSEA unit employees. The purpose of 
the surveillance was to determine how much time Zippilli spent in the custodial room 
during his shift. The camera installed in that area was not part of the District's 
surveillance network system. Unlike the black bubbles covering the District's networked 
cameras, the camera installed by the investigator was not readily visible. The private 
investigator periodically manually accessed images from that camera and had them 
converted to DVD format for the District's use. 
The District's planned use of surveillance cameras continued to be the subject of 
discussions at CSEA unit meetings in May and June 2006. At these meetings, it was 
reported that the cameras would be located in hallways and not in break rooms.3 
The surveillance camera installed by the investigator captured Zippilli and 
another unit employee, Dila Vucinaj (Vucinaj), entering and leaving the custodial room 
on 39 occasions between May 22, 2006 and December 1, 2006. Vucinaj was a 
custodial employee assigned to another District building. The presence of that camera 
was not known to CSEA until the fruit of the surveillance was offered into evidence 
during separate disciplinary arbitrations in March 2007 involving Zippilli and Vucinaj. 
3
 Respondent Exhibits 5 and 6. 
Case No. U-27650 6 -
The District utilized the surveillance images during the arbitrations to demonstrate that 
Zippilli and Vucinaj spent excessive amounts of time in the custodial room during their 
respective shifts instead of performing their job duties. 
DISCUSSION 
In Town ofOrangetown,4 we left open the question "whether and to what extent 
the intrusiveness of overt or covert audio or video taping outside or inside the workplace 
renders it a mandatory subject of bargaining"5 under the-Act. In the present case, 
CSEA's exceptions urge us to resolve that issue by concluding that the District's 
decision to install and continuously utilize a surveillance camera in a work area of a 
District building is a mandatory subject, "including the circumstances under which the 
cameras will be activated, the general areas in which they may be placed, and how 
affected employees will be disciplined if improper conduct is observed."6 
Rapid advances in technology over the decades have resulted in the proliferation 
of various forms of digital and electronic surveillance equipment and software available 
to employers for monitoring workplaces and their employees. While the decision to 
implement such technologies in the workplace may have a relationship to an employer's 
mission, frequently the scope of the data collected, analyzed and distributed can intrude 
4
 40 PERB 1J30D8 at 3023 (2007), confirmed, Town ofOrangetown v New York State 
Pub Empl Rel Bd, 40 PERB 1J7008 (Sup Ct Albany County 2007). In Niagara Frontier 
Transit Metro System, Inc, 36 PERB 1J3036 (2003), we affirmed a decision that found an 
employer's failure to negotiate, upon demand, the impact its decision to utilize videotape 
surveillance images during a disciplinary proceeding violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act. 
The negotiability of the employer's decision to engage in videotape surveillance in the 
workplace was not before us. 
5
 40 PERB H3008 at 3023. 
6
 Brief of Charging Party in Support of Exceptions, pp. 1-2. 
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into protected employee interests.7 In fact, the architectural designs of surveillance 
technologies are not generally tailored to balance the respective workplace interests of 
employers and employees. Some products require that a third party service provider 
receive, store and possess the data on its own equipment for later use by the employer. 
We conclude that, in general, the decision by an employer to engage in 
videotape surveillance of a workplace for monitoring and investigating employees is 
mandatorily negotiable under the Act because it "bears a direct and significant 
relationship to working conditions,"8 it requires employees to be video-surveillance 
participants, and it intrudes upon employee interests including job security, privacy and 
personal reputation.9 The data collected and stored can form the basis for counseling, 
discipline or demotion. It can also reveal protected concerted activities under the Act, 
and aspects of an employee's personal life such as a workplace romance or 
embarrassing personal habits, even when the videotaping is limited to the internal public 
areas of a workplace.10 Finally, we are mindful that videotape images that can be 
7
 See, City of Albany, 42 PERB j|3005 (2009)(an employer can unilaterally impose a 
new work rule only to the extent that it does not significantly or unnecessarily intrude 
upon the protected interests of its employees). 
8
 City of Schenectady, 21 PERB 1J3022 at 3049 (1988). 
9
 See, Colgate-Palmolive Co, 323 NLRB 515 (1997); National Steel Corp, 335 NLRB 
747 (2001), enfd, National Steel Corp v. NLRB, 324 F3d 928 (7th Cir 2003); Anheuser-
Busch, Inc, 342 NLRB 560 (2004), enfd sub nom., Brewers and Maltsters, Local Union 
No. 6 v NLRB, 414 F3d 36 (DC Cir 2005)(subsequent history omitted). 
10
 See, People v. Weaver, 12 NY3d 433, 442-443 (2009)(describing the scope of 
privacy intrusions into an individual's personal life and activities resulting from the 
retrieval and examination of data automatically collected by a GPS device attached to a 
vehicle driven on public roads.J See also, US v Jones, US , 2012 WL 171117 
(January 23, 2012)(Sotomayer, J. concurring) (slip op at 3-4); (Alito, J. concurring) (slip 
op at 11-12). 
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obtained under the Freedom of Information Law,11 by subpoena or by other means, 
could be posted and distributed through the internet. 
To determine whether a particular decision to utilize videotape surveillance in the 
workplace is mandatorily negotiable under the Act, however, requires a fact-specific 
examination of employer and employee interests.12 Among the factors that must be 
considered are the nature of the workplace, and the employer's core mission. For 
example, in a correctional facility, unlike a civilian workplace, videotaping may be 
integral to the employer's core mission, and therefore the subject might be 
nonmandatory if the videotaping is necessary and proportional for meeting that 
mission.13 In other workplaces, where videotape surveillance is not integral to the 
employer's mission, we will balance the respective interests of the employer and the 
employee to determine whether the videotaping significantly or unnecessarily intrudes 
upon the protected interests of unit employees. Among the factors that we will consider 
in applying that balance is the scope and length of the videotaping, and the availability 
of the images to third parties. 
In the present case, the District installed a computer-based camera surveillance 
11
 Public Officers Law §87. 
12
 Board of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York v New York State Pub 
EmplRelBd, 75 NY2d 660, 23 PERB 1J7012 (1990); Arlington Cent Sch Dist, 25 PERB 
1J3001 (1992)(whether an employer's decision to drug test is subject to a balancing of 
employer and employee interests); County of Erie and Erie Co Medical Center Corp, 39 
PERB P036 (2006), confirmed sub nom., Erie Co Medical Center Corp v New York 
State Pub EmpI Rel Bd, 48 AD3d 1094, 41 PERB 1J7002 (4th Dept 2008) )(whether 
employer decision to drug test and conduct criminal background checks is subject to a 
balancing of employer and employee interests). See also, County of Montgomery, 18 
PERB H3077 (1985); State of New York (Department of Correctional Services), 38 
PERB 1J3008 (2005). 
13
 See, Adirondack Cent Sch Dist, 44 PERB P044 (2011)(unilateral decision to end 
practice must be necessary and proportional to meet employer's core mission). 
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network in its school buildings in May 2006 that permits the continuous collection and 
storage of digital images of hallways and other routine work areas of unit employees 
without any human supervision or discretion. Those stored images are viewable for any 
purpose by District representatives with access to the surveillance network computer 
located in the respective building. While the District made a conscious decision not to 
place surveillance cameras inside bathrooms and break rooms out of concern for 
employee privacy,14 the surveillance system clearly affects employee interests, 
including job security.15 
At the same time it installed the surveillance system, the District had a private 
investigator install a concealed motion-activated camera to capture images of the 
hallway outside the custodial room in the Highview basement. The immediate purpose 
14
 Lab Law §203-c prohibits an employer from videotaping an employee in a restroom, 
locker room or a room designated by an employer for employees to change their 
clothing, unless authorized by a court order. Videotaping employees in such areas 
within public workplaces can implicate the constitutional rights of public employees to'be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See generally, Patchogue-Medford 
Congress of Teachers v BdofEduc ofPatchogue, 70 NY2d 57, 20 PERB 117505 (1987). 
15
 We note that the District placed CSEA representatives on notice of its decision to 
institute video surveillance in the workplace and explained its potential future use 
against unit employees. The District, however, summarily rejected Riccaldo's request 
for information about the planned locations for the cameras, and CSEA representative 
Farina agreed with the District's refusal. In Hampton Bays Union Free Sen Dist, 41 
PERB 1J3008 (2008), confirmed Hampton Bays Union Free Sch Dist v New York State 
Pub Empl Rel Bd, 62 AD3d 1066, 42 PERB U7005 (3d Dept 2009), mot denied, 42 
PERB 1J7006 (3d Dept 2009), Iv denied, 13 NY3d 711, 42 PERB 1J7009 (2009), we 
concluded that before a party may refuse to disclose information on the basis of 
confidentiality, it is obligated to first engage in good faith negotiations aimed at 
accommodating the need for the requested information. Negotiations aimed at reaching 
a confidentiality agreement with an employee organization over the scope and nature of 
video surveillance can protect confidentiality and provide the employee organization 
with necessary information to fulfill its obligations under the Act. See, National Steel 
Corp, supra, note 9 (Employer is obligated to disclose information regarding hidden 
cameras because it is relevant to union's discharge of its statutory duties and 
responsibilities, and employer's legitimate confidentiality concerns can be 
accommodated through collective negotiations.). 
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of this camera was narrow in focus: it was part of the District's ongoing investigation to 
determine whether Zippilli was spending his work time performing his duties. It is 
undisputed that CSEA representative Chanowski was notified in May 2006 that the 
District would be monitoring Zippilli's work performance through video surveillance. The 
daily camera surveillance lasted over six months, capturing Zippilli entering and leaving 
the custodial room. The District did not present any evidence to the ALJ justifying the 
scope and length of the video surveillance of the entrance to the custodial room. 
The stored images were periodically retrieved by the third party investigator. There is 
little question that the installation and utilization of this hidden camera affected the terms 
and conditions of employment of Zippilli, Vucinaj, and possibly-other employees utilizing 
the custodial room. Notably, the length and scope of the surveillance was far broader 
and more intrusive upon employee interests than the limited surveillance conducted in 
Elmont Union Free School District.16 In that case, a bus driver was placed under video 
surveillance while driving a school bus on two occasions for the limited purpose of 
confirming complaints from multiple sources that'she was driving through stop signs, 
riding curbs and driving while students were not seated. 
It is unnecessary, however, for us to determine in the present case whether the 
District violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act by its actions because we find merit to the 
District's cross-exception concerning the untimeliness of CSEA's charge. The four-
month time limitation under §204.1 (a)(1) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules) runs from 
the date that CSEA had actual or constructive knowledge of the act or acts that form the 
1628PERBTf4693(1995). 
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basis for the charge.17 CSEA filed its charge more than four months after Chanowski 
learned that the District would be engaging in video surveillance to monitor Zippilli's job 
performance, and after both Chanowski and Farina were notified that the District 
intended to use video surveillance to monitor and discipline unit employees.18 
Therefore, CSEA's charge is untimely, and must be dismissed.19 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge is hereby dismissed. 
DATED: January 24, 2011 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkowltz, Chairperson 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
17
 New York State ThruwayAuth, 40 PERB1J3014 (2007); City of Oswego, 23 PERB 
H3007 (1990); City of Binghamton, 31 PERB 1J3088 (1998). 
18
 Middle County Teachers Assoc, 21 PERB 1J3012 (1988), County of Livingston, 43 
PERB H3018(2010). 
19
 Nothing in this decision precludes CSEA, if it so chooses, from requesting impact 
negotiations concerning the District's decision to engage in video surveillance of unit 
employees. See, Niagara Frontier Transit Metro. System, Inc., supra note 4. 
